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Abstract
Basedonasurveyoftheinventorsof9017Europeanpatentedinventions,thispaperprovidesnewinformationaboutthecharacter-
istics of European inventors, the sources of their knowledge, the importance of formal and informal collaborations, the motivations
to invent, and the actual use and economic value of the patents.
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This paper provides new information, not available
from other sources, on the characteristics of the inven-
tion processes in Europe, and on the economic use and
value of European patents. Our data are drawn from a
survey (PatVal-EU, or PatVal for short) of 9017 patents
granted by the European Patent Ofﬁce (EPO) between
1993 and 1997, located in France, Germany, Italy, the
0048-7333/$ – see front matter © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom (hereafter
“EU6”).
There is a rich literature on the measurement of inno-
vation (for surveys see Griliches, 1990; Patel and Pavitt,
1995). Along with input data such as R&D expenditures
andthehumancapitalemployedinresearch,patentshave
become the most common measure of innovation output
(see Hall et al., 2001, for a survey). A convenient fea-
ture of patents is that they resemble invention counts.3
Moreover, they have been well documented, especially
in recent years thanks to the extensive on-line informa-
tion that can be conveniently organized into databases.
Another advantage of patents is that they can combine
different indicators. For example, patent citations have
been used to measure their importance and economic
value (Trajtenberg, 1990; Hall et al., 2005; Harhoff et
al., 1999), or to describe the direction and geographical
extent of knowledge ﬂows among inventors and patent
holders (Jaffe et al., 1993; Verspagen, 1997). Similarly,
patent claims have been used to account for the scope of
patent protection (Lerner, 1994).
However,patentsalsohaveshortcomings.Theyrelate
only to certain types of inventions, and there are vast
differences across ﬁrms, industries and countries in the
precisionwithwhichpatentsmeasureinnovationoutput.
Moreover, there is still ambiguity about what exactly
patent indicators measure. For example, some studies
have shown that patent citations are a noisy measure
of information ﬂows (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Singh,
2005),particularlybecausemanycitationsareaddednot
by applicants, but by the patent examiners or just to
avoid infringements (e.g. Harhoff et al., 2006; Alcacer
and Gittleman, 2006). Also, Lanjouw and Schankerman
(2004) show that it is hard to distinguish whether patent
claims are a measure of patent scope, degree of protec-
tion or of value. Similarly, citations are correlated with
several aspects of the patent, e.g. its legal robustness and
not just with its value.
The patent data and indicators presently employed
in the literature are drawn largely from patent docu-
ments. As a result, information not in the patent ﬁles
is mostly unavailable. This implies that while certain
aspects about patents or underlying invention processes
3 It is worth to recall the difference between the concepts of inven-
tion and innovation. We refer to inventions as novel ideas, processes,
methods, objects that result from R&D activities. Inventions may (or
may not) be patented. Inventions become innovations when they are
transformedintocommercialisableproductsortechnologies,bymeans
of investments in complementary manufacturing, technological and
marketing assets. As a market of fact, not all inventions turn into
innovations and reach the market.
have been studied extensively, we have little or prac-
tically no information for others. For example, we do
not know much about the inventors, or the nature of the
researchorotherprocessesthatgaverisetotheinvention;
we typically have no measures of the value of the patent
otherthantheproxiesthatwecanretrievefromthepatent
document; and we know very little about whether the
patent is used or not, whether it is licensed, or whether it
is further developed into a new product by the applicant.
The most natural way of collecting this information
is through surveys. Griliches (1990) himself noted that
patent surveys had not been undertaken for a long time.
Since then, Scherer, Harhoff and Vopel conducted a
patent survey in the US and Germany to explore the
distribution of the economic value of patents (Scherer
and Harhoff, 2000; Harhoff et al., 2003b). The Yale sur-
vey (Levin et al., 1987) and the CMU survey (Cohen
et al., 2000) investigated the motivations for patenting
of US ﬁrms. Cohen et al. (2002) presented survey evi-
dence on the role of patents for diffusing information
in Japan relative to the US. Arundel and Steinmueller
(1998)usedtheCommunityInnovationSurveytolookat
patentsasinformationchannelsinEurope.Meyer(2000)
interviewed a group of European inventors of nanotech-
nology patents to understand the connection between
their invention and the scientiﬁc research that they cite.
Tijssen (2002) performed a mail survey amongst Dutch




they have limited European coverage and are mostly
biased towards large companies.
Inordertoovercomesomeoftheweaknessesimplicit
in earlier studies, PatVal is a large-scale survey designed
toberepresentativeoftheuniverseofpatentsinourEU6
countries. It covers all technological ﬁelds, deals with
both for-proﬁt and non-proﬁt applicants, and collects
information on small, medium and large business com-
panies. In 2003, patents with the ﬁrst inventor located in
one of our EU6 represented 42.2% of all EPO patents,
and 88% of the EPO patents whose ﬁrst inventor was
in one of the EU-15 countries. PatVal’s main objective
is to collect information about patents and the underly-
ing invention process on issues that had not previously
been explored in depth because of lack of information in
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Table 1
The PatVal-EU survey: targeted number of patents and response rates
GER SP FRa IT NL UK EU6
Number of patents whose inventors were contacted 10,215 815 4,199 1,857 2,594 7,846 27,531
Number of patents whose inventors responded 3,346 269 1,486 1,250 1,124 1,542 9,017
Response rate (responses/contacts) (%) 32.8 33.0 35.4 67.3 43.3 19.7 32.8
Country share of patents in the ﬁnal sample (%) 37.1 3.0 16.5 13.9 12.5 17.1 100
Distribution by country.
a The French survey was directed to both inventors and applicant organisations.
on three areas: inventors; research collaborations and
spillovers; use and economic value of the patents. In
all of these areas, either the literature does not provide
information on some relevant topic, or there is ambigu-
ity in the existing measures, or the existing information
is potentially incomplete. The three central sections of
this paper discuss the PatVal data that ﬁll some of these
gaps.Theyallstartwithabriefdiscussionoftheexisting
literature.
Section 2 describes the survey and the data collected
through the PatVal questionnaire. Sections 3–5 are the
central sections on the three topics above. The ﬁnal sec-
tion concludes and summarizes the results. Appendix 1
describes the methodology employed to carry out the
PatVal survey. Appendix 2 provides our deﬁnition of the
usesofpatents.Appendix3describesourtestforassess-
ing the inventors’ bias in their answers about the patent
value.
2. The PatVal-EU survey
Thefull-scalePatValsurveystartedinMay2003,and
ended in January 2004. The questionnaire was submit-
ted to the inventors of 27,531 patents granted by the
EPO with a priority date of 1993–1997, and located in
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the
UnitedKingdom.Appendix1describesthedetailsofthe
questionnaire, the sampling strategy, the pilot tests, the
problems faced during the survey, and the solutions that
we adopted.4
OurEuropeaninventorsreturned9216questionnaires
covering 9017 patents.5 Table 1 shows the number
4 While the original target was to focus on the period 1993–1997,
some patents with a priority date of 1998 crept into the sample. How-




192 patents. Since the statistics in the paper are based on the number
of patents, we randomly picked one questionnaire for each multiple-
response patent. However, the multiple responses were used to check
of “contacted patents” (i.e., patents whose inventors
received the questionnaire) and the ﬁnal composition of
the PatVal sample by country: 3346 patents from Ger-
many, 1486 from France, 1542 from the UK, 1250 from
Italy, 1124 from the Netherlands, and 269 from Spain.
There are two issues that we want to highlight at the
outset of our discussion. First, because the distribution
of the economic value of patents is very skewed, we
increased the number of valuable patents in our sam-
ple by over-sampling patents that were either opposed
under the EU opposition procedure before a patent is
granted, or that were not opposed, but had received at




that were either opposed or cited while the population of
EU6 patents with a priority date of 1993–1997 only has
a share of 28.5% of patents of this type. With respect to
the population, our sample will therefore over-represent
patent characteristics that are positively correlated with
oppositionorcitation.Thisproblemdidnotturnouttobe
important when employing sampling weights that cor-
rect for the stratiﬁed sampling.6 Therefore, we report
all of our results in this paper without correcting for
over-sampling.
A second issue arises because the respondents in our
survey – inventors – may not be the best-informed indi-
for the consistency of the information provided by different inventors.
Clearly, not all the questionnaires answered all the questions. Hence,
there are generally some missing data for our variables.
6 Using the computed sampling weights and correcting for non-
response,wefoundthatthecorrectedresultsdonotdiffersubstantially
from the results presented in the tables and ﬁgures presented in this
paper. Differences mainly concern a small share of patents at the very
right-hand tail of the patent value distribution. Intuitively, this is due




points. Appendix 1 explains in greater detail our sampling procedures.
The corrected tables and ﬁgures are available upon request.1110 P. Giuri et al. / Research Policy 36 (2007) 1107–1127
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79.9 5.5 9.1 0.4 1.8 2.9 0.1 0.3 100
Instruments (10.9%) 60.4 7.9 16.7 3.2 3.8 7.0 0.1 0.9 100
Chemicals and Pharm
(18.5%)
81.1 4.9 4.9 0.6 2.6 5.7 0.1 0.1 100
Process Engineering
(24.9%)




67.8 10.5 17.8 0.2 1.1 1.2 0.2 1.2 100
Total (100%) 70.6 8.8 13.7 0.8 2.0 3.2 0.2 0.7 100
Number of observations=8809. The share of patents by technological class (ﬁrst column) use 9014 observations.
viduals with respect to all of our questions. Inventors
are likely to have excellent information on their own
biography and the invention process. For some PatVal
questions,however,companymanagersmighthavebeen
better informed—e.g., for questions on the value of the




a given patent.7 The inventor’s address is in the patent
document and, in addition, the inventor is a well-deﬁned
“type”. A generic person “knowledgeable” about the
patent is a more blurred type. He could be a manager
in the R&D, legal or other department, or the boss of
the inventor, or the technology-licensing manager in a
university. Moreover, since we conducted the survey in
2003, our knowledgeable individual for a patent applied
for in 1993–1997 might have no longer been employed
in the organisation. If we sent the questionnaire to the
organisationwithoutcheckingwhowasgoingtoanswer,
it would be unlikely to produce better estimates and
response rates than asking the inventors. We concluded
that the latter was the best option, at the scale of our
survey, for systematically ﬁnding somebody who had a
reasonably good knowledge about the speciﬁc patent in
question.
Furthermore, we also checked whether the inventors
were knowledgeable enough to respond. Especially dur-
ing the pilot tests (see Appendix 1), and particularly for
the questions on the value of the patents and their use,
we asked them explicitly whether they were sufﬁciently
7 As we shall discuss in Appendix 3, we could do this only for the
French questionnaire.
informed about the topic. In general, they had a pretty
good idea of the answer. As discussed in Appendix 3,
on the speciﬁc question of the patent value we even pro-
duced a statistical test on 354 French patents for which
we had an answer from both an inventor and a manager.
We found that the inventors tended to over-estimate the
value of their patents, but the bias is small.
As a ﬁrst snapshot of the PatVal sample, Table 2
describes the composition of the dataset by macro-
technological classes and by afﬁliation of the inven-
tors. The PatVal patents are classiﬁed into ﬁve
“macro”-technological classes: Electrical engineering,
Instruments, Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals, Process
engineering, and Mechanical engineering.8 The survey
also provides information about inventors’ employ-
ers: small ﬁrms (less than 100 employees), medium
ﬁrms (100–250 employees), large ﬁrms (more than 250
employees),universities,publicorprivateresearchinsti-
tutions, and others.9
The percentage shares of the technological classes
in Table 2 (left-hand column) show that Mechanical
Engineering and Process Engineering are the most rep-
resented technologies in the EU6. As expected, the
8 We used the ISI-INPI-OST classiﬁcation system elaborated by
the German Fraunhofer Institute of Systems and Innovation Research
(ISI),theFrenchPatentOfﬁce(INPI)andtheObservatoiredesSciences
and des Techniques (OST). This classiﬁcation distinguishes between
30 “micro” technological classes and 5 “macro” technology areas
based on the International Patent Classiﬁcation (IPC). For the con-
cordance between ISI-INPI-OST technological classes and EPO IPC
classes, see Hinze et al. (1997). For the PatVal statistics across the 30
“micro”technologicalclasses,seethePatValFinalReport(PatVal-EU,
2005).
9 We adopted the European Commission’s convention that small-
medium ﬁrms have fewer than 250 employees.P. Giuri et al. / Research Policy 36 (2007) 1107–1127 1111
businesssectorandinparticular,largecompanies,arethe
most common source of inventions. The business sector
accountsforabout93%ofallPatValpatents.Universities
accountfor3.2%,andotherPublicResearchInstitutions
for 2%. Moreover, the importance of the large versus
small and medium ﬁrms differs across the EU6. The
highest share of inventors employed in large companies
is in Germany (79.9%), followed by France, Italy, the
UK (all around 60–65%) and Spain (54%).
3. Who are the European inventors?
WhoaretheEuropeaninventors?Whatistheireduca-
tionalbackground?Whataretheirmotivationstoinvent?
The economic and sociological literature has stud-
ied the determinants of researchers’ productivity. It has
typically focused on scientists, showing that their pro-
ductivity distribution is skewed (Lotka, 1926; Allison
and Stewart, 1974; Cole, 1979; Merton, 1968; Arora
et al., 1998). Moreover, age and vintage matter. Scien-
tists become less productive as they get older, although
therearedifferencesacrossresearchﬁeldsandovertime
(Levin and Stephan, 1991; Jones, 2005). This is borne
out after controlling for other observable characteris-
tics of the individual. However, a lack of information on
industrialinventors,particularlyontheirindividualchar-
acteristics, has held back the study of their productivity.
There is practically no large-sample empirical work on
the matter. The few existing studies employ small sam-
ples. For example, Narin and Breitzman (1995) tested
Lotka’sinversesquarelawofproductivityinasampleof
inventors in the R&D departments of four companies in
thesemiconductorindustry.Similarly,Ernstetal.(2000)
analysed the distribution of patents’ quantity and qual-
ity across inventors working in 43 German companies
in the chemical, electrical and mechanical engineering
industries. Their results suggest that inventors’ techno-
logical performance is highly concentrated, with few
key inventors responsible for a large part of the ﬁrm’s
technological output. By using data on publication and
patent records at the level of the individual researcher,
Meyer (2006) studied the relationship between scien-
tiﬁc and technological performance in nano-science
and nano-technology in the UK, Germany and
Belgium.
The PatVal survey provides a unique opportunity to
explore the characteristics of individual inventors, such
astheirsex,age,education,motivationstoinvent,andjob
mobility. Table 3 shows that the share of female inven-
tors is remarkably low. Only 2.8% of the inventors in
our PatVal sample are women. In Chemicals and Phar-
maceuticals this share reaches 7.4%, while it drops to
1.1% in Mechanical Engineering. There is some varia-
tionacrosscountriesaswell.Spainemploys8.2%female
inventors, while Germany is the other extreme with only
1.6%.Thesesharesareevenlowerthanthealreadysmall
share of women among higher education researchers in
the EU-15. According to the European Science & Tech-
nology Indicator Report (European Commission, 2003),
this share is 29% for all disciplines, 23% for science,
and 12% for engineering. There is no reason to believe
that PatVal systematically under-sampled women, as we
carefully selected patents in ways that produced no bias
that we could not control for. Moreover, even in the EU-
15, the lowest share of women is in engineering, and
patenting is frequently an engineering activity. Also, in
PatValtheparticipationofwomenishigherinChemicals
and Pharmaceuticals, which is more science-oriented,
and it is lowest in Mechanical Engineering, a typical
engineering ﬁeld.
According to Commission data, female participation
inscienceandengineeringdeclinesalongthecareerpath.
Data on this phenomenon are scarce. However, Com-
mission data show that the gap between the percentage
of men and women in academia increases dramatically
as we move from undergraduates, where the shares are
similar, to doctoral students, assistant professors, asso-
ciate professors and full professors, where the gap is
Table 3





% of inventors with
tertiary education
% of inventors with
PhD degree
% of inventors who changed
employer after invention
Electrical Engineering 2.0 43.3 82.3 19.1 27.04
Instruments 2.7 44.6 82.0 33.4 25.42
Chemicals and Pharm 7.4 44.5 91.8 59.1 19.99
Process Engineering 2.1 46.6 72.7 22.4 21.20
Mechanical Engineering 1.1 46.2 66.3 9.3 21.54
Total 2.8 45.4 76.9 26.0 22.47
Distribution by technological class. Number of observations differs across columns, between 8861 (age) and 8963 (gender).1112 P. Giuri et al. / Research Policy 36 (2007) 1107–1127
huge. A similar effect might occur in patenting. Table 3
also reports that the average age of our inventors is 45,
which suggests that the production of a patent occurs
when people are no longer young researchers, at least
in Europe. Only 5% of the inventors in our sample are
youngerthan30.Morethan60%arebetween30and50-
years-old. About 30% are between 50 and 60, and only
5% are older than 60. Moreover, we ﬁnd that there is lit-
tle variation across technological classes and countries.
If invention is a process that occurs when people have
completed the initial stages of their careers, then women
are increasingly left out, consistent with observed aca-
demic data in which they are gradually more and more
under-represented in senior positions along the career
path.
To summarize, the low share of women inventors
seems to be consistent with two other observations:
the relatively low participation of women in engineer-
ing, and the reduced share of women along the career
path. However, this does not tell us why women are less
active in engineering than science, or about why they
lose ground along their career path. We thus contribute
to the growing literature on the gender gap in science
and technology by exploring the gender gap for patent
inventors. Our data also conﬁrm that women provide a
considerably unexploited potential of human capital in
Europe. In addition, the PatVal data raise the question
of why European inventors are relatively old. Unfortu-
nately,therearenosystematicdataontheaverageageof
scientists and researchers in Europe, even though exist-
ing evidence suggests that they are relatively old, too
(European Commission, 2003). Our data are consistent
with this view. Moreover, the lack of variation across
countriesandtechnologiesreinforcestheperceptionthat
the reasons are institutional rather than technical or any
other.Again,thissuggestsdirectionsforfurtherresearch
on this matter.
Table 3 also reports the share of inventors with ter-
tiary education. Most European inventors (76.9%) have
a university degree, but the share of inventors with a
doctorate is only 26.0%. The shares of inventors with
a university degree or a PhD vary among technological
classes. The best-educated inventors are in Chemicals
and Pharmaceuticals: 91.8% of them have a university
degree, and 59.1% have a PhD. The least educated ones
are in Mechanical Engineering: 66.3% have a univer-
sity degree and 9.3% hold a PhD. The differences across
countries(notshownintable)areevenmorepronounced.
Germany has the largest shares of both tertiary-educated
inventors (85.3%) and PhDs (35.2%). Spain, France, the
Netherlands, and the UK are close to the EU6 share
while Italy lags behind. Its share of inventors with
tertiary education is only 56.7%, and PhDs account
for only 3.1% of all Italian inventors.10 By employ-
ing multiple correlation analysis on a sub-sample of
793PatVal-EUinventors,MarianiandRomanelli(2007)
found that the inventors’ level of education, together
with the employment in a large ﬁrm and the involve-
ment in large-scale research projects positively affect
the number of patents that an inventor produces over
his career. These factors, however, do not affect directly
the expected value of the inventions. They do only
indirectly, as they found that the number of inventions
explains the probability of producing a technological
hit.
Recent contributions have noted that there is a pos-
itive correlation between researchers’ productivity and
their mobility. They argue that inter-ﬁrm and intra-ﬁrm
mobility serve as a mechanism for creating an accurate
match of employee and employer characteristics (Liu,
1986; Topel and Ward, 1992). Trajtenberg (2005) and
Trajtenberg et al. (2006) is one of the ﬁrst to analyse the
relationshipbetweenmobilityandproductivityforR&D
personnel. The author uses data on 1,565,780 inventors
listedonU.S.patentdocuments.Overall,216,581(33%)
oftheinventorsaremoverswhichmeansthattheseinven-
tors changed their employer at least once. Trajtenberg
(2005) conﬁrms the ﬁndings of the labour economic lit-
erature that mobility has a positive impact on inventive
output, in particular, patents of mobile inventors receive
more citations. Using instrumental variables techniques,
Hoisl (2007) shows for the German sub-sample of the
PatVal-EU inventors that there exists a simultaneous
relationshipbetweeninventormobilityandinventorpro-
ductivity: movers are more productive than non-moving
inventors. Moreover, more productive inventors are less
likely to move. Moreover, the mobility of human capi-
tal produces knowledge spillovers across organisations
(Klepper, 2001). In fact, the job mobility of European
inventors is limited. As discussed in Appendix 1,w e
made a considerable effort to limit the potential under-
sampling of mobile inventors, who are more difﬁcult to
trace because their patent address does not match the
recent telephone directories that we used to ﬁnd our
inventors. We cannot completely rule out that PatVal
datacontainabiasagainstmobileinventors,butwehave
restricted the problem.
10 The hypothesis that cross-country differences depend on the tech-
nological specialisation of the countries is not supported by our data.
The share of Italian patents in sectors like Mechanical Engineering or
Electrical Engineering, which have the lowest share of PhDs, is not
signiﬁcantly larger than the share of German or Dutch patents in the
same sectors (see the PatVal-EU Report, 2005).P. Giuri et al. / Research Policy 36 (2007) 1107–1127 1113
Table 4
Inventors’ rewards
GER SP FR IT NL UK Total
Average importance of inventors’ rewards
Monetary rewards 3.0 2.1 3.6 3.0 2.7 3.0 3.1
Career advances and opportunities for new/better jobs 2.7 2.6 3.3 3.1 2.9 3.3 3.0
Prestige/reputation 3.7 3.3 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.7 3.4
Inventions increase performance of the organisation the inventor works for 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.1 3.9 4.0
Satisfaction to show that something is technically possible 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.9
Beneﬁts in terms of working conditions as a reward by employer 3.0 2.2 1.9 2.8 2.2 2.4 2.6
Share of inventors who received monetary compensation
%Monetary compensation 61.3 14.7 NAa 23.1 17.5 28.2 41.7
%Permanent 4.6 3.2 NAa 5.2 3.8 3.2 4.6
%Transitory 56.7 11.5 NAa 17.9 13.6 25.0 37.1
Number of observations differs across rows, between 7360 (monetary compensation) and 8424 (satisfaction).
a France not included because of too many missing data.
We discuss here the responses to the PatVal ques-
tion that asked how many times the inventor-changed
job after the surveyed patent. Since the survey took
place in late 2003, this is a 6–10 year window. The
furthermost right-hand column of Table 3 shows that
most inventors never changed job during this period.
The EU6 share of inventors who never moved is 77.5%,
with little variation across technological classes. There
are differences, however, across countries (not shown
in table). The least mobile inventors come from Spain,
where almost 90% never changed job, followed by Ger-
many(83.1%)andFrance(82.3%).Attheotherextreme,
34.7% of UK inventors changed job at least once, fol-
lowed by the Netherlands (30.1%). Most of the mobile
inventors moved only once. The share of EU6 inventors
who moved more than once is 7.7%, and the share of
inventors who changed employer more than three times
is 0.8%.
Finally, we investigate the motivations of inventors
to invent. Table 4 reports six motivations, which we
asked inventors to rate from 1 (not important) to 5 (very
important). We distinguished between social and per-
sonal motivations – i.e. effects of the patented invention
on employer’s performance, personal satisfaction, pres-
tige and reputation – and monetary rewards or career
advances. The question focused on the patent under
investigation. This is because some questions were spe-
ciﬁc to it, particularly whether the inventors obtained
rewards for the patent. However, because these motiva-
tionsarelikelytobegeneral,weinterpretedthembroadly
as well.
According to the surveyed inventors, social and per-
sonal motivations are on average more important than
money or career advances (Table 4). The rankings are
similar across the EU6. We cannot rule out that these
results reﬂect aspects of social desirability, but in a ten-
tative way, they suggest that industrial inventors have
similarmotivationsasmembersofthescientiﬁccommu-
nity (Dasgupta and David, 1994). Our inventors might
have been hesitant in declaring that they cared about
selﬁsh concerns like money or career, or they feared
that their employers would learn of their answers and
thenremarkthattheywereconcernedabouttheirperfor-
mance. But even if our inventors were concerned about
hiding their quest for money or career, or they wanted
to ﬂag their concern about their employer, they would
not have given high marks to an independent question
on personal satisfaction.
We think instead that PatVal uncovers another inter-
esting direction for further research. Both scientists and
industrialinventorsarecreativeindividuals,andcreative
individuals have common characteristics, motivations
and goals. We emphasise three similarities. First, as
human capital becomes more important, the owners of
thisasset,whetherscientistorinventor,careaboutthings
that enhance the perception of the asset’s value. Thus,
prestige and reputation are important. In turn, this may
be because of personal satisfaction like fame and glory,
orformoreinstrumentalreasonsliketheopportunitythis
creates for future monetary rewards. Second, an individ-
ualbeneﬁtsfromthegrowthoftheorganisationinwhich
he works because this favours his own prestige, growth
or visibility as well. This may then explain why our
inventors care about the performance of their employer.
Third, unlike other professions, creativity, the search
for knowledge, and the ability to show that something
is possible, can be personally enticing. Thus, scientists
and inventors may engage in it simply for consump-1114 P. Giuri et al. / Research Policy 36 (2007) 1107–1127
tion purposes, which explain the importance of personal
satisfaction.11
Finally,Table4showsthepercentageofinventorsthat
received monetary compensations for the patent under
investigation. In Germany, a compensation scheme to
reward inventors is established by law, which explains
the unusually high share for this country. When German
employers claim inventions developed by their employ-
ees, they have to compensate them “reasonably” on the
basis of the expected value of the invention, and follow-
ing the guidelines provided by the German Employees’
InventionsActpassedin1957(HarhoffandHoisl,2007).
In other countries, there are no ofﬁcial rules, and any
compensation stems from the speciﬁc incentive poli-
cies of ﬁrms. After Germany (61.3%), the UK shows
the highest share (28.2%). As we shall also see later
in this paper, this is consistent with the UK’s greater
degree of technological entrepreneurship. UK inventors
mayreceivecompensationassociatedwithproﬁt-sharing
orsimilarmechanismswhicharemoretypicalofsmaller
concerns. The lowest shares are in Italy (23.1%), the
Netherlands (17.5%) and Spain (14.7%). In general,
apart from Germany, and partly the UK, these ﬁgures
show that employers rarely provide their inventors with
monetaryincentives.Table4alsoshowsthat,whenthese
incentives exist, they are typically transitory.
4. Collaborations, spillovers and sources of
knowledge
4.1. Sources of knowledge spillovers
Agrowingliteraturehasstudiedthesourcesofknowl-
edge that ﬁrms and scientists use for invention and
innovation, and the mechanisms with which they obtain
this knowledge. One is the creation of formal and
informal networks of collaboration among researchers
or institutions. Knowledge spillovers, which are more
intensewhenthereisgeographicalproximity,alsoimply
access to external knowledge, with implied beneﬁts
(Jaffe, 1986; Jaffe et al., 1993). Empirical evidence
conﬁrms the clustering of innovative activities and
the geographical dimension of knowledge spillovers.
Verspagen (1997) estimates their effect on ﬁrm and
regionaleconomicgrowth.Inaddition,therearesectoral
differences in spatial clustering. Skilled- and R&D-
11 We also found that there are differences in the ranking of the moti-
vations across macro technological classes. This is consistent with our
discussion. Even in science, the scientiﬁc ethos is higher for instance
in physics or other more traditional hard sciences.
intensive industries beneﬁt to a greater extent from
co-location and knowledge spillovers (Audretsch and
Feldman, 1996).
In order to assess whether ﬁrms or research insti-
tutions rely on each other’s knowledge bases, and to
measure the geographic dimension of this exchange,
most contributions use patent citations. Jaffe et al.
(1993) analysed the spillovers across geographically
close inventors. Similar studies have been carried out
for Europe (Verspagen, 1997; Verspagen and De Loo,
1999; Verspagen and Schoenmakers, 2004). For the US
and Japan, Branstetter (2001) suggests that knowledge
spilloversareprimarilyintra-nationalinscope.Although
interesting, the validity of these results depends on the
reliability of patent citations as a measure of knowledge
ﬂows. However, this is not widely accepted. Jaffe et al.
(2000) conﬁrm that patent citations reﬂect knowledge
spillovers as perceived by the participants, albeit with
substantial noise. Also Jaffe et al. (1998) ﬁnd that two-
thirds of the citations to patents of the NASA-Lewis
Electro-Physics Branch could be related to spillover
effects. By contrast, Alcacer and Gittleman (2006) show
thatanimportantfractionofpatentcitationsareincluded
byexaminersratherthanbyinventors.Thismakespatent
citations a noisy measure of the extent and direction of
the knowledge ﬂows. Moreover, these contributions do
not explain the sources of knowledge spillovers. Only
somerecentstudiesshowthattheyarenotunintentional,
and that the rise of externalities depends on the com-
plementary actions of economic agents (Zucker et al.,
1998). Harhoff et al. (2006) even argue that European
patent citations should not be used at all for spillover
analysis, because 93% of these citations are generated
by the examiner or search ofﬁcer at the European Patent
Ofﬁce.
The PatVal data allow us to consider the sources of
spilloversandknowledgeﬂowswithoutresortingtocita-
tionmeasures.Thissectionusesdifferentindicatorsfrom
PatVal to shed some light on these issues. It examines
the importance of R&D collaborations among individu-
alsandorganisations,theroleofgeographicalproximity
to establish them, and the use of different sources of
knowledge in the invention process.
4.2. The role of collaborations in the production of
inventions
The patent document lists the names of the inven-
tors. Only one-third of the PatVal patents involve a
single inventor. Thus, a patented invention is typically
the result of teamwork. The patent document, however,
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inventors belonging to the same or different organisa-
tions, or give details of the type of collaboration they
establish.
Co-application (i.e. patents applied for by more than
one organisation) is the only information concerning
collaboration provided by the patent document. The
literature has used this information to identify R&D
collaborations, and to proxy for the sharing of intel-
lectual property rights (Hagedoorn, 2003). However,
there may be collaborations that do not end up in a
joint application. At the same time, the information on
co-applications does not provide any details on several
featuresofthecollaboration,likewhichinventorbelongs
to which organisation, or whether they all belong to the
same one, or what the type of collaboration is. More-
over, as Hagedoorn (2003) himself points out, ﬁrms
consider this type of partnering sub-optimal, due to
the legal complexities involved in the management of
intellectual properties across ﬁrm boundaries and inter-
national patent jurisdictions. Hagedoorn also shows that
co-patenting is more frequent in chemicals and phar-
maceuticals where patent protection is stronger and the
scope for legal controversies is more limited. Therefore,
apart from under-estimating the extent to which there is
collaboration in R&D, the data on co-patenting may be
biased towards speciﬁc technologies.
ThePatValquestionnaireaskedtheinventorswhether
some of their co-inventors belonged to other organisa-
tions. It also asked whether the patent was developed
in collaboration with other partners and if the collabora-
tionwasamongindividualsoramonginstitutions.These
questionsmakeitpossibletouncovercollaborationsthat
are not “visible” from the patent document.
The ﬁrst column of Table 5 shows that the EU6
share of co-applied patents in our sample is 3.6%.
It ranges between 5.4% for France and 2.8% for the
UK. It is slightly higher in the second column where
we include among the co-applicants companies belong-
ing to the same corporate group. The third column
reports the share of patents in which the inventor
declared that some co-inventors were from another
organisation. This share is 15% for the EU6, which is
substantially higher than the co-applied patents. This
is a stunning result. It is also larger for the UK, and
smaller for Spain and Italy. Additional analysis of
our data revealed that the share of patents with exter-
nal inventors is smaller for ﬁrms, and particularly for
large ﬁrms (about 12%), as compared to non-proﬁt
research institutions. As expected, ﬁrms tend to inter-
nalise the invention process, and to mostly coordinate
internally the production of invention and transfer of
knowledge among inventors. We also found that ﬁrms,
and particularly large ﬁrms, had a lower share of co-
applications.
The share of patents in which the inventors declare
that there were collaborations with other institutions
is even higher. Along with the higher share of col-
laborations with external inventors, this suggests that
co-applications capture a small fraction of actual collab-
orations. Collaborative patents in the EU6 are slightly
more than 20%, with the Netherlands reaching 34.5%,
and Germany falling to 13.3%. The two furthermost
righthand columns of Table 5 show that about three-
quarters of the collaborations are of a formal nature.
In the questionnaire, we deﬁned formal collabora-
tions for the respondents as relationships based on
well-deﬁned contracts among the parties. Firms, and
particularly large ﬁrms, exhibit a lower share of col-
laborative patents compared to research institutions and
universities.
Table 5


















GER 3.1 5.0 15.4 13.3 9.5 3.8
SP 3.0 3.4 9.4 19.6 16.9 2.7
FR 5.4 7.0 12.3 22.7 19.8 2.9
IT 4.0 4.8 9.6 21.9 14.3 7.6
NL 3.3 8.2 15.9 34.5 26.9 7.6
UK 2.8 7.8 21.1 23.3 19.0 4.3
Total 3.6 6.1 15.0 20.5 15.8 4.7
Number of observations differs across columns, between 8501 (collaborations) and 9013 (co-applied patents).
a Co-applied patents are patents applied for by more than one organisation. Patents with external co-inventors are patents listing more than one
co-inventor, and with at least two co-inventors employed by different organisations at the time of the patent.1116 P. Giuri et al. / Research Policy 36 (2007) 1107–1127
4.3. Geographical proximity and exchange of
knowledge among inventors
Anotherfactorpromotingtheexchangeofknowledge
may be geographical proximity. We compare the extent
to which geographical or organisational proximity (i.e.
afﬁliation to the same organisation) encourages collab-
oration. PatVal asked inventors to rate from 1 to 5 the
importance of four types of interactions in the devel-
opment of the patented invention: (1) interactions with
peopleintheinventor’sorganization,andgeographically
close (who could be reached in less than an hour); (2)
interactions with people in the inventor’s organization,
and geographically distant (more than 1h distant); (3)
interactions with people not in the inventor’s organi-
zation, and geographically close; (4) interactions with
people not in the inventor’s organization, and geograph-
ically distant.
Fig.1showstheimportanceofthefourtypesofinter-
actions. Organisational proximity is the most important
category. Interactions in the same organization are on
average more important than interactions with people
in other organizations, especially when they are geo-
graphically close. Fig. 1 reports the total EU6 data, but
we ﬁnd the same pattern for all six countries individu-
ally. Surprisingly, interaction with geographically close
individuals in other organizations is the least impor-
tant form of collaboration. This is puzzling given the
emphasis in the literature on the importance of geo-
graphical proximity for collaboration and knowledge
transfer. Geographically localised spillovers may be
more important in technological ﬁelds featuring small
technology-intensive companies organised in clusters.
Wecheckedwhethergeographicalproximityrankeddif-
ferentlyacrosstechnologicalclasses,buttheimportance
of the four types of interactions in the 5 macro- and 30
micro-technological classes of the ISI-INPI-OST clas-
siﬁcation system does not change. By means regression
analysis, Giuri and Mariani (2007) found that being in
a technological cluster does not increase the importance
of local interactions. Rather, the results of the study sug-
gest that local knowledge interactions are established
because of the individual inadequacy to enter wider net-
works: the higher the scientiﬁc content of the research
conducted and the inventors’ educational background,
the wider the research networks. Yet, we cannot rule out
that geographical proximity and formation of techno-
logical clusters are less important in Europe than other
regions of the world (much of literature pertains to the
US), but our result is puzzling, nonetheless.
4.4. Sources of knowledge in the invention process
The PatVal survey also asked inventors to rate the
following sources of knowledge from 1 (not important)
to5(veryimportant):competitors,suppliers,customers,
other patents, scientiﬁc literature, participation in con-
ferences and workshops, university and public research
labs. Fig. 2 shows the average assessment of the impor-
tance of these sources.
Customers are the most important source of knowl-
edge for invention processes, followed by the patent and
scientiﬁc literature. The prominent role of customers is
consistentwithalong-standingviewintheliterature.The
Fig. 1. Importance of geographical and “organisational” proximity of inventors. Scale: 1 (not important) to 5 (very important). Number of
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Fig. 2. Average importance of six sources of knowledge used to develop invention (Scale 1–5). Number of observations=8824.
SAPPHO project developed at SPRU in the 1970s noted
that the ability to understand user needs was the most
important success factor in the production of innova-
tions (Freeman and Soete, 1997), and this result is likely
to apply to inventions as well. Similarly, the importance
of a customer-active paradigm has been central in the
work of von Hippel (2005). The score of patent litera-
ture suggests that the new-patented inventions rely on
earlier technological developments, and that the avail-
abilityofinformationcontainedinthepatentsfavoursthe
circulation of knowledge. Moreover, it supports the use
of patent indicators. If patents are an important source
of knowledge, it makes sense to use patent citations to
accountfortheimportanceofthepatentsortheextentof
knowledge spillovers from the cited to the citing docu-
ment.Similarly,theimportanceofthescientiﬁcliterature
is consistent with the use of patent indicators based on
their citations to scientiﬁc sources.
It is not surprising that university and public research
labsaretheleastimportantsourceofknowledge.Infact,
the distance between academic inventions and commer-
cialpatentedinventionsislargeinmostindustries.There
can be many steps before the more academic knowledge
becomesusefultoﬁrms.Inthisrespect,users,customers,
suppliers, patents, and more generally industrial sources
of knowledge are more important. However, the high
score of scientiﬁc literature suggests that the more aca-
demicknowledgeisnotunimportantperse,butthelinks
with universities or public research labs require effort
andinvestmentinestablishingrelationships.Bycontrast,
scientiﬁc literature is readily available provided that one
has the required absorptive capacity. In fact, because of
a good deal of codiﬁcation in scientiﬁc discourse, the
scientiﬁc literature provides a relatively good access to
relevant knowledge, and there is not much need for the
more costly investments of searching for or linking to
research labs. Certainly, actual links with a lab provide a
gooddealoftacitknowledgethatcannotbeabsorbedjust
from reading the literature, but the effort to link to the
research labs may be relatively less important because
the scientiﬁc literature already supplies a good deal of
the relevant information.
5. The use and value of EPO patents
5.1. The use of patents
Howdoﬁrmsusetheirpatents?Whyaresomepatents
exploited commercially, while others are licensed out,
and yet others are not used? This section uses the PatVal
data to answer these questions.
The path between invention and the commercialisa-
tionofanewproductoranewtechnologycanbelongand
costly. Moreover, not all inventions and new technolo-
gies translate into commercially proﬁtable innovations.
Many patents are never exploited, and only a few of
them yield economic returns. The decision whether to
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factors. For example, the patent owner might not pos-
sess the downstream assets to exploit it. Most often,
this occurs when the patent owner is a small ﬁrm, an
individual inventor, or a scientiﬁc institution. In these
cases, licensing becomes an option (Arora et al., 2001;
Rivette and Kline, 2000). Large ﬁrms also have unex-
ploited patents (Palomeras, 2003; Rivette and Kline,
2000). Some of them are used strategically to block
rivals, to improve the company’s bargaining power in
cross-licensingagreements,ortoavoidbeingblockedby
competitors (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Ziedonis, 2004).
The literature emphasises the policy implications of the
private decision not to use a patent (Scotchmer, 1991;
MazzoleniandNelson,1998).Thestrengthofpatentpro-
tection can increase the propensity to patent and reduce
its use. Moreover, the social cost of not using a patent is
higher when the patent has a broad scope. In this case,
the applicant is less likely to own the full set of het-
erogeneous assets and competencies that are required
to exploit it in its many directions. Yet, patent owner-
ship means that the patent holder can prevent others
from using it in any of these ways (e.g. Merges and
Nelson,1990).Nagaoka(2003)reportsdataontheuseof
patents by large Japanese ﬁrms, and Cohen et al. (2000)
show the motivations for patenting of large US compa-
nies with formal R&D departments. Both studies show
that,apartfromprotection,licensing,cross-licensingand
other strategic factors like “blocking patents” are impor-
tant reasons for patenting.
These issues need further empirical investigation.
For example, the literature on licensing has focused
on the industries in which licensing is more frequent,
like computers, semiconductors, and chemicals (e.g.
Grindley and Teece, 1997; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001, for
the semiconductor industry; Cesaroni, 2003; Grindley
andNickerson,1996,forthechemicalindustry;Kollmer
and Dowling, 2004, for the biopharmaceutical indus-




or not, and how it is used is largely unavailable, espe-
ciallyforEurope,andespeciallyatthecross-countryand
cross-industry scale of our study.
Thus,PatValprovidesauniqueopportunitytoexplore
these issues. It asked the inventors whether their patents
were used for commercial or industrial purposes, or if
they were licensed. It also asked them to rate the impor-
tance of different motivations for patenting (on a 1–5
scale), including licensing, cross-licensing and strategic
reasonslikeblockingcompetitors.Appendix2describes
how we used these responses to deﬁne the following six
uses of the patents:
(1) Internal use: the patent is exploited internally for
commercial or industrial purposes, it can be used in
a production process or it can be incorporated in a
product;
(2) Licensing: the patent is not used internally by the
applicant, but it is licensed out to another party;
(3) Cross-licensing: the patent is licensed to another
party in exchange for another patented invention;
(4) Licensing and use: the patent is both licensed to
another party and used internally by the applicant
organisation;
(5) Blocking patent: the patent is used neither internally
nor for licensing, and was applied for to block com-
petitors;
(6) Sleeping patents: the patent is not employed in any
of the uses described above. It may still have option
value to the holder as an asset protecting a com-
pletely different technical approach, but it unfolds
no blocking effect w.r.t. competitors.
Table 6 shows that half of EU6 patents (50.5%) are
exploited by the applicant organisation for industrial
and commercial purposes. About 36% are not used. Of
















Electrical Engineering 49.2 3.9 6.1 3.6 18.3 18.9 100.0
Instruments 47.5 9.1 4.9 4.3 14.4 19.8 100.0
Chemicals and Pharm 37.9 6.5 2.6 2.5 28.2 22.3 100.0
Process Engineering 54.6 7.4 2.0 4.9 15.4 15.7 100.0
Mechanical Engineering 56.5 5.8 1.8 4.2 17.4 14.3 100.0
Total 50.5 6.4 3.0 4.0 18.7 17.4 100.0

















Large companies 50.0 3.0 3.0 3.2 21.7 19.1 100.0
Medium sized companies 65.6 5.4 1.2 3.6 13.9 10.3 100.0
Small companies 55.8 15.0 3.9 6.9 9.6 8.8 100.0
Private research institutions 16.7 35.4 0.0 6.2 18.8 22.9 100.0
Public research institutions 21.7 23.2 4.3 5.8 10.9 34.1 100.0
Universities 26.2 22.5 5.0 5.0 13.8 27.5 100.0
Other Govt. institutions 41.7 16.7 0.0 8.3 8.3 25.0 100.0
Other 34.0 17.0 4.3 8.5 12.8 23.4 100.0
Total 50.5 6.2 3.1 3.9 18.8 17.5 100.0
Distribution by inventors’ employer. Number of observations=7556.
are sleeping patents. Finally, 6.4% of the patents are
licensed,4.0%arebothlicensedandinternallyused,and
3.0%areusedincross-licensingagreements.Table6also
shows that there are differences across our ﬁve macro-
technological classes. However, they are not substantial.
There are more interesting differences across types
of applicants. Table 7 shows that large ﬁrms use 50%
of their patents internally. They trade less than 10%
of them, and about 40% are not used. More than half
of the unused inventions aim at blocking competitors.
The large share of unused patents by large ﬁrms is also
likely to stem from their lower marginal cost of patent-
ing.Becauseoftheirlargerscale,theypatentmoreoften.
Forthisreason,theycreateinternaldivisionsspecialised
in patenting or licensing, or they have specialised man-
agers or assets dedicated to this task. They then exhibit
a higher propensity to patent because of the ﬁxed costs
involved. As a result, they also patent minor inventions,
which are less likely to be used. In fact, this is consis-
tent with the lower share of unused patents by small




ﬁrms, and a much higher rate of licensing. The latter is
a notable difference. Overall, the small ﬁrms license out
26% of their patents and leave 18% unused, which pro-
vides a striking contrast to large ﬁrms which license out
only 10% and leave 40% of their patents unused. This
is one of the most remarkable ﬁndings of PatVal: ﬁrm
size and ﬁrm type explain a large part of the variation
in the extent to which patents are used or licensed. As
expected, public or private research organisations and
universities license a large fraction of their technologies
anddonotusetheminternally(e.g.Moweryetal.,2001).
Thedifferentlicensingbehaviouroflargeandsmallﬁrms
is also conﬁrmed in multivariate analyses. By using the
PatVal data Gambardella et al. (2007) ﬁnd that the most
important determinant of patent licensing is ﬁrm size.
Other factors like patent generality, value, protection,
non-coretechnologies,scientiﬁcnatureofthepatentalso
affect licensing, but their impact is smaller. They also
ﬁnd that while all the above factors affect the willing-
ness to license a patent, only a few of them, and mainly
ﬁrm size, affect the probability that licensing actually
occurs.
5.2. Entrepreneurship and patents
The role of patents as the foundation of new enter-
prises is conceivably an important one. Patents may be
associated with the creation of new ﬁrms in technology-
based businesses and may thus contribute to more
competition and more innovation. Many start-ups in
biotechnology, semiconductors, instruments and chem-
icals use intellectual property as their core asset. Quite
often a patent, or possibly a group of patents, represents
the key element around which a start-up sets its entire
business. As Gans et al. (2002) or Arora and Merges
(2004) have noted, when property rights are strong and
wellenforced,newcompaniesaremorelikelytostartup
because they can specialise in developing the technol-
ogy and selling it to other ﬁrms, without incurring the
muchhighercostsandrisksofinvestinginthelargescale
assets for production and commercialisation. Moreover,
patents help them ﬁnd ﬁnancing or corporate partners
because they provide an independent assessment of the
value of the company’s competencies.
Recent contributions have studied these issues,
mostly in the US. They have analysed the formation
of spin-offs that use patents licensed from universities
(ShaneandKharuna,2003),largeﬁrms(Klepper,2001),
and venture capitalists (Gompers et al., 2006). Cross-
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Fig. 3. New ﬁrm creation from patented invention. Distribution by country and by technological class. Number of observations=7391.
limited,however.TheevidenceforEuropeiscompletely
missing.
The PatVal survey asked inventors whether their
patents were exploited commercially by starting a new
company. Fig. 3 shows the share of patents in the PatVal
sample used to start a new ﬁrm by country and tech-
nological class. For the EU6, 5.1% of the patents give
rise to a new ﬁrm. This share is larger in the UK (9.7%)
and Spain (9.3%). It is smaller in Germany (2.7%) and
France (1.6%). As a general remark, the share of UK
patents that give rise to a new ﬁrm provides additional
evidence of the peculiarity of the UK in several aspects
of the innovation process. Along with the largest share
of new ﬁrm formation, the UK has the largest share of
licensedpatents,ofinventorswithtertiaryeducationand
PhDs, and of patents by universities and research insti-
tutions in general. In terms of technological classes, the
share of new ﬁrms is larger in Instruments (7.5%), fol-
lowed by Process Engineering (5.6%) and Mechanical
Engineering (5.4%). In Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals
only 3.1% of the patents are used to create a new ﬁrm.
One of the more proliﬁc “micro”-technological classes
is Medical Technology with 10.5% of patents that gave
rise to a new ﬁrm.
5.3. The economic value of patents
The literature has used indirect measures to estimate
the monetary value of patents. They include the number
of citations that patents receive after their publication
(Trajtenberg, 1990; for a survey see Hall et al., 2001),
the renewal fees paid by the patent holders to extend
the patent protection (Pakes and Schankerman, 1984;
Pakes,1986;SchankermanandPakes,1986),thenumber
of backward citations to other patents and to the non-
patent literature (Harhoff et al., 2003a), the number of
countriesinwhichthepatentisregisteredforprotection,
and the incidence of opposition and annulment proce-
dures (Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004). In addition, Lanjouw
and Schankerman (2004) constructed a composite indi-
cator of the quality of patents. Only a few studies have
used survey-based information on the economic value
of patents, but they are limited to speciﬁc countries (see,
for German and US patents, Harhoff et al., 1999, 2003a,
2003b; Scherer and Harhoff, 2000).
PatVal asked inventors to produce their best estimate
of the value of their patented inventions. More precisely,
the inventors were asked to estimate the minimum price
at which the owner of the patent, whether the ﬁrm, other
organisations, or the inventor himself, would have sold
the patent rights on the day on which the patent was
granted. To improve the accuracy of this estimate we
askedtheinventortoassumethatatthetimeofthiscoun-
terfactual sale, he would have had all the information
available at the moment in which he responded to the
questionnaire.12
12 Thequestionnairewassubmittedin2003–2004,whichis6–7years
after the application year of the latest patents in the survey. This is a
sufﬁcient time span for a good deal of the information about the use
andvalueofthepatentstobecomeavailable.AsnotedinSection2,the
inventors may not be the most informed respondents about the value
of patents. See our earlier discussion, and Appendix 3 which describes
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Fig. 4. The value of European patents across macro-technological classes. Number of observations=7752.
Fig.4showsthedistributionofthevalueofthePatVal
patents by technological class. The questionnaire asked
inventors to rank the present value of their patents in
1 of 10 value classes, ranging from less than 30,000
Euros to more than 300 million Euros.13 Our results
conﬁrm the skewness of the distribution of patent val-
ues (Harhoff et al., 1999, 2003b; Scherer and Harhoff,
2000). Only 7.2% of the patents in our sample are worth
more than 10 million Euros, and 16.8% have a value
higher than 3 million Euros. A share of 15.4% has a
value between 1 and 3 million Euros. The largest share
of patents falls in the left-hand of the distribution. About
68%ofallourpatentsproducelessthan1millionEuros,
and about 8% have a value lower than 30,000 Euros.14
We note that our intervals in Fig. 4 were constructed
to obtain a logarithm scale of the variable, i.e. the dif-
ference between the logs of the two boundaries of any
interval (rather than their absolute values) is roughly
equal. Thus, Fig. 4 shows the distribution of the log of
the patent values. Since the log of a variable is more
skewed than the variable itself, the actual distribution
13 Clearly, patent values are affected by our over-sampling of impor-
tant patents. Yet, as noted, our correction produced very small
differences because the over-sampling regards only a small share of
patents at the right tail of the distribution.
14 We cannot rule out that the inventors have over-estimated the val-
ues at the very left tail of the distribution. This is because it may be
psychologicallydifﬁcultforarespondenttodeclarethathisinnovation
is worth nothing, or a very small amount. We address this problem in
Appendix 3 of this paper.
of patent values is even more skewed than the one in
Fig. 4.
There are some slight differences in the value of the
patentsacrosstechnologicalclasses.Forexample,inven-
tionsthatareworthmorethan10millionEurosaremore
frequent in Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals (11.7%)
compared to all the other sectors and to the overall
sample(7.2%).Correspondingly,only58%ofChemical
and Pharmaceutical patents generate less than 1 million
Euros, while the same share for Electrical Engineering,
Instruments,ProcessEngineeringandMechanicalEngi-
neeringisabout70%.Thisconﬁrmsthatpatentsaremore
valuable in chemicals and pharmaceuticals compared to
mechanical and electronic technologies.
6. Conclusions
Apart from a few patent surveys with limited
European coverage and mostly biased towards large
companies, the managerial and economic literature has
suffered from the limited availability of detailed and
direct data on the characteristics of invention processes
and the economic value of its output. The PatVal survey
was designed to close this gap. Compared to previous
surveys on patents, PatVal has a much broader coverage
intermsofEuropeancountries,andintermsoftypesand
size of the applicant organisations.
The paper ﬁrst described the characteristics of
European inventors. It conﬁrms the extremely limited
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2.8% of the total PatVal sample. In terms of educational
background,aboutthree-quartersoftheEuropeaninven-
tors in the PatVal dataset have a university degree. Only
one quarter have a PhD, with Italy lagging behind in
both categories. Moreover, the European inventors are
not very mobile across jobs. More than three-quarters
of the PatVal inventors never moved from their job in a
window of about 10 years after they produced the patent
for which they were interviewed. The UK exhibits the
largestshareofinventors(almost40%)whochangedjob
at least once during their career.
PatValoffersnewinformationaboutthemotivationof
inventors to invent. Typically, inventors consider mon-
etary rewards and career advances less important than
personal and social rewards, like personal satisfaction,
prestige,reputation,andcontributiontotheperformance
of the organisation. As far as the invention process is
concerned, only one-third of the patents are developed
by individual inventors, suggesting that most inventions
are the outcome of a team activity. However, the vast
majorityofco-inventorsbelongtothesameorganisation.
Only 15.0% of the EU6 patents are produced by teams
of inventors afﬁliated with different organisations. At
the organisational level, 20.0% of patents are developed
in collaboration with other institutions. About three-
quarters of these collaborations are formalised through
speciﬁc contracts, as opposed to being established on an
informal, non-contractual basis. Finally, by comparing
theshareofco-appliedpatentswiththeshareofcollabo-
rative patents, a large fraction of collaborations does not
result in joint patent applications. Since the latter (co-
patentingbymultipleapplicants)istheonlyinformation
on collaboration in the patent document, the available
information in the patent ﬁles severely under-estimates
the actual extent of collaboration in the development of
patents. We therefore signal caution in interpreting co-
applicationpatternsasa“true”measureofcollaboration.
Customers are the most important source of knowl-
edgeforthepatentedinvention,followedbyotherpatents
and the scientiﬁc literature. Competitors, participation
in conferences and workshops and suppliers rank next.
Surprisingly,universityandnon-universityresearchlab-
oratories are the least important source in all of our
EU6countries.Wealsofoundthatwhile“organisational
proximity” (i.e. being in the same organisation) encour-
ages interactions of the inventors with other sources of
knowledge, geographical proximity does not inﬂuence
the probability of collaboration when the researchers
belong to different organisations. Geographical proxim-
ity is not important either for the technologies that are
known for being characterised by geographical cluster-
ing. This might suggest that, when examined using a
large-scale sample of patents and inventions, the extent
of localised geographical interactions for invention is
more limited than emphasised by the literature. In addi-
tion, it may be particularly unimportant in Europe.
The survey also produced information about the use
and non-use of patents. We ﬁnd that about one-third
of the patents are not used for speciﬁc economic or
commercial activities (whether exploited internally or
licensed). Of these about half are dormant, while the
others are blocking patents. Moreover, only 13.4% of
patents are licensed. The most interesting difference is
betweenlargeandsmallﬁrms.Smallﬁrmslicenseabout
26% of their patents and leave only 18% of patents
unused, while the respective percentages for larger ﬁrms
are10and40%.Sincelargeﬁrmspresumablyhavelower
patenting costs, they probably patent minor inventions
as well, which are less likely to be used. For the smaller
ﬁrms, patenting costs are important, and they tend to
patent only inventions for which they can obtain some
returns. As an alternative explanation, it might be pos-
sible for larger ﬁrms to derive greater strategic value
frommarginalpatents,e.g.,byusingthemtodeterentry.
Moreover, the higher share of licensing by small ﬁrms
is consistent with a growing literature suggesting that
ﬁrms with limited downstream assets are more likely
to exploit their inventions through technology trade.
Finally, we conﬁrm that the distribution of patent val-
ues is highly skewed, and only a few patents yield large
returns.
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Appendix A. The PatVal-EU Survey
A.1. The questionnaire
The PatVal questionnaire focused on the topics
described in Section 2, and it was divided into sixP. Giuri et al. / Research Policy 36 (2007) 1107–1127 1123
sections:(A)Inventor’sPersonalInformation;(B)Inven-
tor’s Education; (C) Inventor’s Employment and Mobil-
ity; (D) The Invention Process; (E) Inventor’s Rewards;
(F) Value of the Patent. The questionnaire is down-
loadable at http://www.lem.sssup.it/projects/resﬁles/
Patval ANNEX I Questionnaire.pdf.
A.2. The sampling procedure
At the time of the survey our six countries covered
42.2% of the total EPO patents by country of ﬁrst inven-
tor, and 88.0% of the EPO patents with country of ﬁrst
inventor being one of the EU-15 (source: EPO EPASYS
database). Patents were assigned to countries accord-
ing to the location of the ﬁrst inventor in the inventors’
list. The share of questionnaires submitted to inven-
tors in each country depended on the country share of
patentsinthewholepopulation:Germany49.7%,France
19.5%,theUK15.0%,Italy8.5%,theNetherlands6.2%
and Spain 1.07%. We under-sampled the share of Ger-
man and French patents, and over-sampled the patents
invented in the other countries in order to have sufﬁ-
ciently large samples for all of them. Since our goal
was to receive about 10,000, we set the following tar-
get responses by country: 3500 for Germany, 1750 for
France, 1750 for the UK, 1250 for Italy, 1250 for the
Netherlands, and 500 for Spain. The response rate in the
pilot surveys helped to decide the number of question-
naires to send to the inventors in each country to obtain
returns close to the target. To improve the response rate,
theEPOandtheEuropeanCommissionprovideduswith
a cover letter for the questionnaire.
Our population is composed of all the EPO granted
patentswithaprioritydatebetween1993and1997.This
is because, if we sampled very “old” patents, it would
have been difﬁcult to track down the inventors or to ﬁnd
someone who remembered enough about the invention
process. By contrast, very “recent” patents might not
carry enough information about their value and use.
In the sampling procedure we took into account that
the distribution of patent values is highly skewed. We
therefore over-sampled the “important” patents, which
we deﬁned as patents that were opposed or that received
at least one citation. Without such an over-sampling we
would probably end up with very few patents in the
upper tail of the distribution of patent values. In the end
we selected a stratiﬁed sample of 27,531 EPO patents
that included all the opposed or cited patents in the
1993–1997 patent population, and a random sample of
the uncited and unopposed patents. As noted in the text,
the over-sampling procedure produced about 15% addi-
tional observations for the opposed or cited patents at
an aggregate EU6 level (43.2%) compared to the initial
population (28.5%). The full PatVal Final Report (2005)
alsoreportsindividualcountrysharesofopposedorcited
patents in the population of patents with a priority date




a potential bias against the more proliﬁc inventors. To
avoid this problem, we sent a maximum of ﬁve ques-
tionnaires per inventor even if he/she was listed in more
than ﬁve patents in our sample (very few cases). We also
asked multiple patent inventors to ﬁll out the complete
questionnaire for only one patent, and to skip Section A
(and possibly B and C) in the other patents. Whenever
possible, we asked the co-inventors to ﬁll out some of
thesepatents,andwemadeaparticularefforttoconvince




submitting the questionnaire in each country (mail, tele-
phone, internet) and to check whether the respondents
understood the questions clearly. In the ﬁnal pilot test
we reproduced the conditions under which the full-scale
survey would be performed.
A.4. Searching for the inventors
A critical task of the survey was to ﬁnd the recent
addresses and telephone numbers of the inventors
listed in the patents. We faced two problems. First,
we needed the inventors’ telephone number to check
for their address and to contact them for the telephone
interviews. Second, many addresses of the “mobile”
inventors at the time of the survey had changed with
respect to those listed in the patent in 1993–1997.
Duringthepilottestswedesignedacommonsetofrules
to search for the inventors’ addresses and telephone
numbers in the six countries.
Westartedbylookingfortheaddressoftheﬁrstinven-
tor listed in the patent in telephone directories of each
country involved. We obtained 64% “exact-matches”,
i.e. the name–surname and address listed in the patent
wasthesameasinthedirectories.Theseinventorscould
thus be easily found and approached.15
15 Some inventors listed the address of the organisation for which
they worked. We then contacted the company and asked to interview






in the phone directory, we contacted the inventor before
submitting the questionnaire. Clearly, this was not sufﬁ-
cient as it might produce a bias towards the mobile and
productiveinventorswhoproducedlaterEPOpatents.To
trace inventors who did not have other EPO patents we
performedthefollowingsearch:(1)wecheckedwhether
the same name–surname was in the city at a different
address. In this case, we called the person. If there were
up to 2–3 individuals with the same name–surname, we
called all of them to ﬁnd out who was our inventor; (2)
we searched for the same name–surname in the wider
regional area and at the national level. Again, we called
the person to ﬁnd out whether he was the inventor (up
to 2–3 people); (3) we used the address of the second
or third inventors (if there were any) in our 1993–1997
survey sample of patents, and we asked them for infor-
mation about the ﬁrst inventor (including his address).
Only if we could not ﬁnd the ﬁrst inventor, did we ask
the second or third inventor to respond to the question-
naire; (4) we ﬁnally searched for the inventors in the US
patentdata,andwesurfedontheinternetforusefulinfor-
mation. To achieve overall uniformity of the procedure
we issued “Guidelines to search for inventors” that were
distributed to all team members.
The UK showed some differences. First, exact-
matches were only 18%, compared to 65% in France,
86% in Germany, 62% in Italy, 66% in the Netherlands
and 89% in Spain. This is because in the UK people can
choose whether or not they want to be listed in the tele-
phone directory, whereas in the other countries they are
listed without permission being asked. Thus, to obtain a
number of responses comparable to the other countries,
in the UK we had to send out a much larger number
of questionnaires. They were sent to the address of the
inventorlistedinthepatent.Thereturnedquestionnaires
were clearly a subset of the inventors whose address
matched that in the patent. We then performed an addi-
tional search following the steps above to avoid biases
againstthemobileinventors.IntheUK,wehadtheaddi-
tional problem that directories do not report the full ﬁrst
name of the customers, making Steps 1, 2, and in part 3
above hard to perform, with a large number of telephone
calls needed to ﬁnd the right person.16
16 See the PatVal Final Report (2005) for response rates, and sev-
eral other details concerning the search for inventors, or questionnaire
submissions.
Our ﬁnal sample of 9017 patents includes 7%
responses from inventors whose exact address only
matched a later EPO patent (after 1997), and 5% inven-
torswithoutalaterEPOpatent,whoseaddresswasfound
withthisprocedure.17 Theremaining88%responsesare
exact matches. Because the average of exact matches
is 64%, our full-scale dataset under-represents the 36%
non-exact matches. Also, we have no way to ﬁgure out
whethertheproportionbetweeninventorswithandwith-
out later EPO patents is really 7–5. Thus, we have to be
careful about this potential bias in our data. However,
the fairly high rate of exact matches (64% on average,
but even above 80% for Germany or Spain) suggests
that in Europe the mobility of inventors is not pro-
nounced. Hence, the extent of this potential bias may
not be dramatic. The problem may be more serious for
the UK.
A.5. The full-scale survey
In order to maximize the response rate, each team
chose the methodology to apply to his country dur-
ing the full-scale survey, and all the teams employed
a “recall strategy”. Details of the speciﬁc country strate-
gies for the interviews are in the PatVal-EU Report
(2005). The full-scale survey started in May 2003. The
last country to ﬁnish the interviews was France in April
2004.18
Appendix B. Deﬁnition of the six uses of the
patents
The deﬁnition of the “uses” of patents takes up ﬁve
questionsofthePatValquestionnaire.Theﬁrsttwoques-
tions ask (answers Y/N)19:
(Q1) Has the patent been exploited commercially?
(Q2) Has it been licensed to an independent party?The
other three questions ask about the motivations to
patent (answers 1–5; 1=not important; 5=very
important):
17 The differences across countries in the two percentages are
small.
18 In each country a professional poll-company conducted one or
more steps of the survey. Only the Dutch team performed all the tasks
internally, while in France the survey was conducted by the Minist` ere
de la Jeunesse, de l’´ Education Nationale et de la Recherche, and it
started in September, 2003.
19 Both Q1 and Q2 allowed for a third response, viz. “No, but still
investigating the possibility”. For this purpose, we lumped it together
with “No”.P. Giuri et al. / Research Policy 36 (2007) 1107–1127 1125
(Q3) Haslicensingforrevenuepurposesbeenanimpor-
tant motivation for this patent?
(Q4) Has cross-licensing been an important motivation
for this patent?
(Q5) Has the goal of blocking competitors been an
important motivation for this patent?
We then deﬁned:
Internal use (only)=(Y ,N)
Licensing (only)={(N, Y)∪[(Y, Y)∩(Q3=4–5)]}
∩(Q4=1–3)





The deﬁnition of the licensed-only patents takes into
account the possibility that the respondents have inter-
pretedtheexpression“exploitedcommercially”inQ1as
including either licensing or internal exploitation. Thus,
apart from patents in which the respondent answered
“No” to Q1 and “Yes” to Q2, our licensed-only patents
includepatentsinwhichtherespondentsanswered“Yes”
to both Q1 and Q2, provided that they gave a high score
(4or5)tolicensingforrevenuepurposesasamotivation
for patenting. Cross-licensing are licensed patents (i.e.
Q2=Yes) with a high score (4–5) to cross-licensing as a
motivation.
Appendix C. Check for validity of responses: the
French test
We performed a statistical test to check the poten-
tial bias in the inventors’ responses. The opportunity
arose from the French survey which was conducted by
the Minist` ere de la Jeunesse, de l’´ Education Nationale
et de la Recherche in Paris. The Statistical Department
of the Ministry had extensive databases and informa-
tion about applicant organisations that made it easier to
contact them. As a result, unlike the other countries,
in which all the questions were asked to the inven-
tors, in the French case the questions about costs of the
research, source of funding, use of patents, and value
of the patent families were asked to the patent applicant
and not to inventors. The question about the monetary
value of the individual patent was asked to both inven-
tors and companies. All the other questions were asked
only to inventors. We then used for our test the question
on the value of the single patent, which was asked to
both. For this question the French questionnaire had 354
patentswithvalidanswersbybothinventorandapplicant
organisation.20
We ﬁrst found that the distributions of the value
classesprovidedbytheinventorsandthemanagersover-
lap to a great extent. Moreover, a two-tail t-test did not
reject the hypothesis that the two means are different
for a p-value <10%. Pride or other factors may induce
inventors to boost the results of their work, and hence
to over-estimate the value of their patents. If so, it is
reasonable to employ a one tail t-test of the null hypoth-
esis of no difference between the two means against the
alternative that the mean response of the inventors is
higher than that of the managers. In this case the null
hypothesis is rejected at p<5%, suggesting that inven-
tors over-estimate the value of their patents compared
to managers. However, such an over-estimation is small.
The PatVal-EU Report (2005) describes the details of
these and other tests that we performed.
We also compared the different responses between
inventors and managers in small and large ﬁrms. As
noted earlier, inventors in large companies may be less
informed about the value of their patents because of
the greater organizational distance and more intensive
specialisation of tasks. As a result, the gap in response
should be wider in these ﬁrms. Among our 354 French
patents we distinguished between the patents applied
for by the large ﬁrms (more than 250 employees),
small-medium ﬁrms (less than 250 employees), and uni-
versitiesandotherresearchorganisations.Wefoundthat
a slight over-estimation of the inventor’s assessment of
the value of their patents compared to the managers is
produced by inventors in the large ﬁrms. The differ-
ence is smaller for small-medium ﬁrms and inventors
in academia and other non-proﬁt research institutions.
See the PatVal-EU Report (2005) for detail.
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